A Lesser of Two Evils
By Eric Lorber
This week, at the cost of hundreds of Mehdi army militiamen and dozens of Iraqi government soldiers, Iraqi forces secured the most sacred site in Shia Islam, the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. Although government forces have achieved control of the mosque complex, the question remains, have they silenced Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi army for good? What does it mean that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, the respected Shia cleric, brokered the peace deal, and not the Iraqi government? Is this resolution the first step towards a more stable, less violent Iraq?
A concrete resolution was necessary to ensure that al-Sadr’s Mehdi army could not challenge the sovereignty of the fledging government. Al-Sadr could not have been allowed to maintain control of Najaf, a Shiite stronghold, because it would fracture the country along sectarian lines. If Najaf remained as an independent fiefdom, where the Iraqi government did not exercise control, then the goal of both the United States and Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to create an Iraqi government that encompasses Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish populations would be impossible. In addition, the last time the United States and the Iraqi government confronted the Mehdi army two months ago, they backed down to avoid an outcry of public dissent for taking action that could jeopardize the Imam Ali Shrine. The militia used the period between the current flair in fighting to rebuild its arsenal and organization. The U.S. and Iraqi governments could not accept anything short of complete disarmament and disbanding of the army this time around for fear that history would repeat itself and al-Sadr would use the reprieve to once again build his forces. Finally, action had to be taken to avoid the Fallujah syndrome: leaving an ungoverned region where extremism could breed.
The immediate crisis seems to be over, as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, a rival of al-Sadr, brokered a peace treaty that provided al-Sadr immunity from an indictment that he murdered a rival cleric Abdel-Majid al-Khoei last year. In addition, the Mehdi army, already reeling from a sustained siege of the city, has disbanded and its members have retreated, returning to their jobs and routines in Najaf.
Far from being a rosy picture of a conflict resolved without a final siege of the Imam Ali Mosque (which would have caused an uproar in Iraq and the Muslim world), al-Sadr and his Mehdi army remain an influential force in the region. First, in an interview with an Iraqi government spokesperson, the immunity granted to al-Sadr appears tenuous. The immunity from charges will last only as long as the interim government remains in power; when elections come next year. This has serious implications for al-Sadr’s future actions. If he fears being jailed despite the immediate promise of immunity, it is quite conceivable that he will attempt to rally his supporters to his cause once again. In addition, although the Mehdi army has been disbanded, they are by no means gone. They have retreated into the houses and business of Najaf. They have given up their weapons, but not their ideas nor their support of al-Sadr’s politically active version of Shia Islam. Al-Sadr could easily reorganize this force if his power or freedom was threatened. It is also important to note that, while the fighting has ended in Najaf, the Mehdi army continues to operate in the Sadr section of Baghdad and other cities throughout the country. The threat al-Sadr poses to the Iraqi government is far from over.
Beyond this unvanquished threat, the brokering of peace in Najaf has created a super-empowered religious leader in al-Sistani. The Shia Cleric, already well respected by both Iraqi and Iranian Shiites, has proven himself more powerful and capable than both the United States and the Iraqi Government; he ended the Najaf standoff non-violently when the others could not. The question arises, have attempted to remove al-Sadr from a position of influence only to replace him with another fundamentalist cleric?
At first glance, al-Sistani appears to be a far cry from al-Sadr; he is an elder, extremely well respected and relatively moderate cleric where al-Sadr is young, firebrand and fanatical. Al-Sistani also comes from the Quietist school of thought, a Shia school that believes clerics should advise leaders but not actively engage in politics. Al-Sadr, on the other hand, takes the Khomeini approach: religious leaders should be political leaders. However, looking at al-Sistani’s words leads one to be nervous about acquiescing such power to him: he wants to create an independent Shia state in Iraq. In addition, his ties to Iran are troubling. Al-Sistani is Iranian-born and continues to maintain close contacts with the Iranian government and people. Although more moderate than al-Sadr these ties and his stated objective to create a Shia state in Iraq indicate that the United States and the Iraqi government might conflict with al-Sistani in the future. Now that al-Sistani has proven himself to be more affective than either the United States or the Iraqi government, it is possible that Iraqi Shiites will support him and not the current government.
The Iraqi government now controls Najaf, but at what cost? A temporary disbanding of the Mehdi army, the failure to bring al-Sadr to justice, and the empowerment of an individual with objectives contradictory to the goals of the government. In the Imam Ali Mosque, gunfire has quelled and replaced with prayer, but at a cost that was far too high.
By Eric Lorber
This week, at the cost of hundreds of Mehdi army militiamen and dozens of Iraqi government soldiers, Iraqi forces secured the most sacred site in Shia Islam, the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf. Although government forces have achieved control of the mosque complex, the question remains, have they silenced Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi army for good? What does it mean that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, the respected Shia cleric, brokered the peace deal, and not the Iraqi government? Is this resolution the first step towards a more stable, less violent Iraq?
A concrete resolution was necessary to ensure that al-Sadr’s Mehdi army could not challenge the sovereignty of the fledging government. Al-Sadr could not have been allowed to maintain control of Najaf, a Shiite stronghold, because it would fracture the country along sectarian lines. If Najaf remained as an independent fiefdom, where the Iraqi government did not exercise control, then the goal of both the United States and Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi to create an Iraqi government that encompasses Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish populations would be impossible. In addition, the last time the United States and the Iraqi government confronted the Mehdi army two months ago, they backed down to avoid an outcry of public dissent for taking action that could jeopardize the Imam Ali Shrine. The militia used the period between the current flair in fighting to rebuild its arsenal and organization. The U.S. and Iraqi governments could not accept anything short of complete disarmament and disbanding of the army this time around for fear that history would repeat itself and al-Sadr would use the reprieve to once again build his forces. Finally, action had to be taken to avoid the Fallujah syndrome: leaving an ungoverned region where extremism could breed.
The immediate crisis seems to be over, as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, a rival of al-Sadr, brokered a peace treaty that provided al-Sadr immunity from an indictment that he murdered a rival cleric Abdel-Majid al-Khoei last year. In addition, the Mehdi army, already reeling from a sustained siege of the city, has disbanded and its members have retreated, returning to their jobs and routines in Najaf.
Far from being a rosy picture of a conflict resolved without a final siege of the Imam Ali Mosque (which would have caused an uproar in Iraq and the Muslim world), al-Sadr and his Mehdi army remain an influential force in the region. First, in an interview with an Iraqi government spokesperson, the immunity granted to al-Sadr appears tenuous. The immunity from charges will last only as long as the interim government remains in power; when elections come next year. This has serious implications for al-Sadr’s future actions. If he fears being jailed despite the immediate promise of immunity, it is quite conceivable that he will attempt to rally his supporters to his cause once again. In addition, although the Mehdi army has been disbanded, they are by no means gone. They have retreated into the houses and business of Najaf. They have given up their weapons, but not their ideas nor their support of al-Sadr’s politically active version of Shia Islam. Al-Sadr could easily reorganize this force if his power or freedom was threatened. It is also important to note that, while the fighting has ended in Najaf, the Mehdi army continues to operate in the Sadr section of Baghdad and other cities throughout the country. The threat al-Sadr poses to the Iraqi government is far from over.
Beyond this unvanquished threat, the brokering of peace in Najaf has created a super-empowered religious leader in al-Sistani. The Shia Cleric, already well respected by both Iraqi and Iranian Shiites, has proven himself more powerful and capable than both the United States and the Iraqi Government; he ended the Najaf standoff non-violently when the others could not. The question arises, have attempted to remove al-Sadr from a position of influence only to replace him with another fundamentalist cleric?
At first glance, al-Sistani appears to be a far cry from al-Sadr; he is an elder, extremely well respected and relatively moderate cleric where al-Sadr is young, firebrand and fanatical. Al-Sistani also comes from the Quietist school of thought, a Shia school that believes clerics should advise leaders but not actively engage in politics. Al-Sadr, on the other hand, takes the Khomeini approach: religious leaders should be political leaders. However, looking at al-Sistani’s words leads one to be nervous about acquiescing such power to him: he wants to create an independent Shia state in Iraq. In addition, his ties to Iran are troubling. Al-Sistani is Iranian-born and continues to maintain close contacts with the Iranian government and people. Although more moderate than al-Sadr these ties and his stated objective to create a Shia state in Iraq indicate that the United States and the Iraqi government might conflict with al-Sistani in the future. Now that al-Sistani has proven himself to be more affective than either the United States or the Iraqi government, it is possible that Iraqi Shiites will support him and not the current government.
The Iraqi government now controls Najaf, but at what cost? A temporary disbanding of the Mehdi army, the failure to bring al-Sadr to justice, and the empowerment of an individual with objectives contradictory to the goals of the government. In the Imam Ali Mosque, gunfire has quelled and replaced with prayer, but at a cost that was far too high.
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