Out of Commission
By Anna Schwartz

Beneath the din of the media frenzy at the Democratic National Convention, a quieter battle for political proprietary rights to the 9/11 Commission report has begun.  Both the Bush administration and the Kerry campaign have advocated the adoption of many of the report’s less-controversial proposals. The White House move towards advocacy of the report’s recommendations, however, (a capitulation which took place in less than a day), is nothing short of a partisan attempt to steal any momentum garnered by the position of the Kerry campaign: that the Commission should remain in place for an additional eighteen months, in order to ensure that the administration and Congress employ its proposals.  Less than a week after its publication, the Commission’s report, perhaps the most carefully crafted bi-partisan work in decades, has become political battleground. 

One of the more controversial proposals in the report, the creation of a so-called “intelligence czar,” (formally, Director of National Intelligence), a cabinet-level overseer of all the intelligence agencies, plays a key role in this battle for political ownership.  The underlying issue here is not whether September 11 could have been prevented, but rather who is to blame for the lack of prevention.  The creation of a Director of National Intelligence – a position which will be far from apolitical – poses several problems, not the least of which is that it already exists, in a non-partisan form, in the position of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).  Notwithstanding George Tenet’s reign of incompetence, the DCI is, technically and legally, the overseer of the entire intelligence community, including the CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSC.  Tenet’s lack of control and cohesion stemmed partially from his own failings, but mainly from the fact that the DCI controls only 12 percent of the intelligence budget; the Secretary of Defense wields a mighty 85 percent share of the purse. 

The creation of a DNI may seem like a good idea in theory, but it poses three major risks if established: first, that the DNI will become a presidential puppet, a risk all cabinet members share; second, that the DNI will become a paper pusher like Tom Ridge; and third, that the DNI will be subject to the Weberian problem of bureaucracy, valuing self-preservation and aggrandizement over action.  Even advocates of the creation of this position admit these perils: the creation of a new czar has the potential to “produce a Frankenstein's monster of disparate parts stitched together like the Department of Homeland Security.”  The problem of bureaucracy is immediately visible, even during the debate over the creation of the position: the chair and vice-chair of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, have made it clear that they wish to be considered for the appointment – indeed, the word on K street is that they are forerunners for the position.  At its most benign, this hustling undermines the credibility of the commission’s recommendation for the creation of the position.  

Rather than creating an entirely new position, Congress should amend the existing position of the DCI, giving him full control over the intelligence budget in addition to a fixed term. Cabinet positions are inherently political, and even an office with a fixed term is subject to the political whim of the president who makes the appointment.  The overseer of this nation’s intelligence, especially with the continued presence of a terrorist threat, should have no involvement in partisanship.  And although the 9/11 Commission has proven to be exemplary evidence that bi-partisanship is possible, two crotchety old men who have come out of retirement to run the commission have no business running the intelligence community.  Instead of adding to the unwieldy behemoth that is the intelligence bureaucracy, Congress should take measures to streamline and amend the current intelligence infrastructure.  Protecting this nation is anything but a partisan issue, and the creation of a Cabinet-level DNI will serve exactly the opposite purpose that the 9/11 Commission intended it to serve: in an election year in a nation more politically polarized than it has been in decades, nothing is sacred.  Two candidates that have no qualms mobilizing the issue for their campaigns will certainly have no qualms in appointing a party hack to the new position.