Achieving Strategic Stability in South Asia
By Eric Lorber

With the recent resurgence of high-level talks between India and Pakistan’s foreign ministers, friendly cricket matches, and development of Confidence Building Measures (CBM’s) such as direct hotlines, a resolution to some of the conflicts between the two nations may not be far behind. But is an end to the threat of nuclear war on the Indian sub-continent finally here?

No. On the surface, these talks appear indicative of a trend that will lead to an eventual resolution of the Kashmir conflict as well as an eventual non-aggression pact between India and Pakistan. A closer examination, however, reveals the extreme instability of the region: an immediate, bilateral resolution to Kashmir is not close at hand. Both countries have avoided the Kashmir issue in recent talks and any amelioration of the situation will require drastic changes on both sides of the valley. Pakistani President Musharraf will have to rein in Islamic militants – an action which he has thus far been unwilling to take. A primary reason for continued Islamic terrorist attacks is the valid assertion that Kashmiris are being abused by Indian military and police forces. India claims these actions are legitimate because they are designed to crack down on terrorism, and therefore will not take action to stop them until Pakistan stems the flow of militants into the region. This cycle is vicious at best.

The situation becomes more pessimistic when viewed from a strategic perspective. Although confidence-building measures and nuclear response centers are being developed to increase nuclear stability, the development of Indian armed forces counters these positive measures. War is certainly possible between the two nuclear powers, as they have fought limited wars in 1999 and again in 2002. India has begun a process of force transformation that is designed to give all of its divisions offensive strike capability. Pakistan cannot keep up with these military developments, and has begun to rely more and more on nuclear weapons as a balance to Indian conventional power. If another war were to break out, Pakistan could easily use nuclear weapons against Indian forces, triggering a nuclear war in the region.

With such a doomsday scenario so plausible, the question then becomes how to prevent it. The answer: to broker peace in Kashmir through third-party mediation. Kashmir has served as the catalyst for conflict over the past half-century, most recently in 1999 and 2002. If a peaceful resolution can be found to this problem, then the possibility of nuclear war between the two nations will be nullified. India, however, is reluctant to allow intervention to occur, a reluctance which stems from its belief that any advantage it holds in bilateral negotiations will be negated by third-party intervention.

The United States is the only nation in the position to intervene. The leverage that the United States enjoys is purely mathematical: currently, the U.S. gives Pakistan $3.5 billion in aid; India’s economy has prospered from U.S. Direct Investment.

The U.S. has an important strategic interest in both countries; peace and prevention of nuclear war is in our best interests. U.S. companies are heavily invested in India (GE alone makes a profit of over $1 billion annually) and Pakistan is an important ally in the War on Terror. If these two countries were destroyed by nuclear war, so too would our economic interests and our invaluable partner in the War on Terror.

Mediation of this conflict requires that the United States totally re-evaluate its policy towards the region. Currently, the United States has a policy of crisis management. This means that, when a conflict occurs, the U.S. sends an envoy to region to broker an end to immediate hostilities, as occurred in 2002, when Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage successfully calmed tensions over the Line of Control. Crisis management policy is designed to allow the United States to maintain good relations with both countries and avoid becoming entangled in the complicated politics of Kashmir, as U.S. policy makers fear becoming involved will threaten good relations with both countries.

This crisis management approach has serious flaws: it is reactionary in nature and with the speed of modern warfare; the United States might not be able to react in time to prevent a conflict. Crisis management fails to solve the source of the conflict; it merely tries to treat the symptom. With Stephen Cohen, Senior Policy Fellow at the Brookings Institution predicting at least two more conflicts between India and Pakistan, the need to act decisively now becomes even more pressing.

The proper approach is conflict resolution. This would effectively end the risk of conflict from occurring by settling the issue of contention. The potential negative consequences of a conflict resolution approach, such as India decreasing economic ties with the United States, are not likely to occur because Pakistan needs US foreign aid and India requires US investment capital to keep its economy growing strong.

An agreement over Kashmir would be beneficial for India, Pakistan, and the United States: it would ensure stability, economic growth, open markets, and increased trade for India and Pakistan, and would allow the United States to further its economic interests in India and security interests in Pakistan. Now is the time for the United States to shift its policy towards the region to ensure a stable, peaceful relationship between India and Pakistan, and maintain our interests in the region.