What Would China Do?
By Anna Schwartz
On the eve of a Taiwanese referendum on independence, mainland China's intentions are clear: stop a formal declaration of independence at any cost. Chinese officials have declared that even the referendum itself would be cause for war. China is willing to risk its booming economy, its hosting of the Olympic Games in 2008, and its world reputation in order to prevent a formal secession in Taiwan, which the government regards as a “renegade province.” Now that China has explicitly stated its bottom line, a position from which it is unlikely to step down, United States policymakers must decide how to handle the issue – one that is delicate at best, and disastrous at worst.
During the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. formally recognized Chang Kai Shek’s Taiwanese government as China itself; this changed with Nixon’s engagement with China in 1970, and economic ties with China have continued to deepen ever since. Moreover, China is an essential ally in the United States’ negotiations with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program. However, the United States must also remember its principles: the right of self-determination of any nation that believes itself sovereign, for legitimate reasons, is one that is fundamental to United States ideals. Mainland China’s decision to use force in order to prevent Taiwan from declaring its sovereignty is one that the United States should neither support nor tacitly accept: China’s might does not make right.
In practice, however, the United States’ defense of Taiwan, due to Chinese aggression, would be unwise. The United States values its strategic partnership with China in its attempts to dismantle the North Korean weapons program, as well as its trade with the Chinese mainland (trade with Taiwan is only a fraction of that with China). In the event of a Chinese attack, the United States will, at minimum, slap the Chinese government with economic sanctions – an act that will be just as damaging to our economy as it is to theirs – but it must not engage in military defense of Taiwan. The necessity of this distance is twofold: first, our military is spread far too thin and our political capital with the rest of the world is far too low to launch yet another war of liberation, even if it is warranted. Second, North Korea’s weapons program is of much greater strategic importance to the United States than an inter-Chinese scuffle – China’s government is unlikely to democratize anytime soon, and because we are already heavily engaged in trade, we must accept the Chinese aggression out of self-interest.
The Taiwanese parliament’s decision to change the requirements for referendum will help to postpone the issue, but not indefinitely: although the bar has been raised on the requirements for referendum, it is still possible that one will occur – possibly as soon as next March. The Taiwanese incumbent president, Chen Shui-ban, has used the China issue as a political device to propel his re-election campaign, and the referendum is sure to occur during Mr. Chen’s next term if he is re-elected. China is already unhappy with the United States’ position (or lack thereof) on the Taiwan issue: Sunday’s upcoming state visit by China’s Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, is sure to include discussion of China’s displeasure at the United States’ deficiency in stating its position on Taiwan’s agitations.
The United States should use the leeway gained by the postponement of the referendum to expedite Chinese negotiations with North Korea, so that if Chinese aggression does occur, our strategic links will either be solidly in place, (if the talks are well underway), or of diminished importance (if the negotiations have concluded). Regardless, we must not allow China to use North Korea as political currency against us on Taiwan. The United States should distance itself from the conflict if possible, but simultaneously take actions to make clear to China that we will not be out-bullied.
By Anna Schwartz
On the eve of a Taiwanese referendum on independence, mainland China's intentions are clear: stop a formal declaration of independence at any cost. Chinese officials have declared that even the referendum itself would be cause for war. China is willing to risk its booming economy, its hosting of the Olympic Games in 2008, and its world reputation in order to prevent a formal secession in Taiwan, which the government regards as a “renegade province.” Now that China has explicitly stated its bottom line, a position from which it is unlikely to step down, United States policymakers must decide how to handle the issue – one that is delicate at best, and disastrous at worst.
During the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. formally recognized Chang Kai Shek’s Taiwanese government as China itself; this changed with Nixon’s engagement with China in 1970, and economic ties with China have continued to deepen ever since. Moreover, China is an essential ally in the United States’ negotiations with North Korea regarding its nuclear weapons program. However, the United States must also remember its principles: the right of self-determination of any nation that believes itself sovereign, for legitimate reasons, is one that is fundamental to United States ideals. Mainland China’s decision to use force in order to prevent Taiwan from declaring its sovereignty is one that the United States should neither support nor tacitly accept: China’s might does not make right.
In practice, however, the United States’ defense of Taiwan, due to Chinese aggression, would be unwise. The United States values its strategic partnership with China in its attempts to dismantle the North Korean weapons program, as well as its trade with the Chinese mainland (trade with Taiwan is only a fraction of that with China). In the event of a Chinese attack, the United States will, at minimum, slap the Chinese government with economic sanctions – an act that will be just as damaging to our economy as it is to theirs – but it must not engage in military defense of Taiwan. The necessity of this distance is twofold: first, our military is spread far too thin and our political capital with the rest of the world is far too low to launch yet another war of liberation, even if it is warranted. Second, North Korea’s weapons program is of much greater strategic importance to the United States than an inter-Chinese scuffle – China’s government is unlikely to democratize anytime soon, and because we are already heavily engaged in trade, we must accept the Chinese aggression out of self-interest.
The Taiwanese parliament’s decision to change the requirements for referendum will help to postpone the issue, but not indefinitely: although the bar has been raised on the requirements for referendum, it is still possible that one will occur – possibly as soon as next March. The Taiwanese incumbent president, Chen Shui-ban, has used the China issue as a political device to propel his re-election campaign, and the referendum is sure to occur during Mr. Chen’s next term if he is re-elected. China is already unhappy with the United States’ position (or lack thereof) on the Taiwan issue: Sunday’s upcoming state visit by China’s Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, is sure to include discussion of China’s displeasure at the United States’ deficiency in stating its position on Taiwan’s agitations.
The United States should use the leeway gained by the postponement of the referendum to expedite Chinese negotiations with North Korea, so that if Chinese aggression does occur, our strategic links will either be solidly in place, (if the talks are well underway), or of diminished importance (if the negotiations have concluded). Regardless, we must not allow China to use North Korea as political currency against us on Taiwan. The United States should distance itself from the conflict if possible, but simultaneously take actions to make clear to China that we will not be out-bullied.
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